The recovery chain for post-consumer textiles involves at least four distinct actor groups—producers, collectors, sorters, and recyclers—each operating under different cost structures, different revenue dependencies, and different exposures to market volatility. EPR frameworks assume these actors will function as a coordinated system. In practice, they are connected by transactions, not by aligned incentives. That distinction matters enormously when the economics of any one segment come under pressure.
On the question of how brands should engage with this reality, Jepsen is direct: "While some large brands may internalize selected components—such as branded take-back schemes or resale platforms—full vertical integration of reverse logistics is unlikely to be efficient at scale. Reverse logistics benefits from aggregation across brands. Independent collectors and sorters operate on economies of scale that enable viable grading, redistribution, and recycling processes.
“Additionally, specialist operators possess deep market knowledge regarding resale demand across regions and product categories. Under EPR pressure, collaboration models are likely to prevail. Brands can focus on design for durability, repairability, and recyclability, while specialist partners manage collection, sorting, and value maximization. Such partnerships reinforce the existing reuse economy, protect employment within sorting and resale sectors, and accelerate circular performance without duplicating infrastructure."
The pressure point most immediately visible is the collection and sorting middle. Kontovrakis is direct about where the current misalignment sits: "at the moment incentives to producers, collectors, sorters, and recyclers are not fully aligned. Design incentives must be strong enough to drive product change, while collection, sorting, and recycling partners need predictable, financially viable compensation." The French system offers a live illustration of what happens when that compensation becomes unpredictable. In late 2025, collectors and sorters in France faced acute financial strain due to global resale market oversupply. Kontovrakis notes that "the French PRO has since increased payments to prevent insolvencies and protect national sorting capacity"—an emergency intervention that revealed how thin the economic margin across the sorting middle had become, even within the world's most developed textile EPR programme.
Resale market softness is not the only external force capable of destabilising the recovery chain. Because virgin synthetic fibres are derivatives of petroleum, crude oil price movements directly affect the competitive position of recycled alternatives. A sharp drop in oil prices can rapidly erode brand commitments to recycled fibre, undermining the offtake agreements that chemical recyclers depend on to justify their capital investment—and exposing the entire economic case for circularity to a variable that EPR frameworks have no mechanism to control.
The instability is not only a function of resale market volatility. It is also a function of what EPR programmes choose to measure. Lisa Jepsen argues that "tonnage-based collection targets, while straightforward to communicate, do not inherently drive optimal environmental outcomes. The greatest environmental and social benefits in textiles arise from reuse, followed by high-quality recycling—not from collection alone." When collection volume becomes the primary performance metric, the system optimises for throughput rather than outcome. High-grade reusable garments and low-grade salvage are counted identically, creating no incentive to invest in the sorting and grading infrastructure that would differentiate them.
Jepsen points to concrete remedies: verified reuse rates as a performance measure rather than raw collection volumes; EPR fees modulated by durability, fibre type, and recyclability; compliance credits for resale and second-life outcomes; and lifecycle carbon savings built into reporting metrics. In her view, "aligning incentives with the waste hierarchy ensures that higher-value circular outcomes are prioritised."
From a market perspective, the same misalignment is visible. Craig McAndrews, President and CEO of RTCM, identifies the structural gap directly. "At this stage, most EPR discussions feel more focused on compliance than on creating clear economic incentives. The opportunity exists if programs direct funding toward collection, sorting, and recycling infrastructure. If structured well, EPR could help stabilise supply and improve feedstock quality, but that outcome will depend heavily on how the policies are implemented." That conditionality matters. EPR does not reorganise a system simply by existing. It does so only through the design choices embedded in its fee structures, its performance metrics, and its funding flows—choices that several current frameworks have deferred or avoided entirely.
The Clock Is Already Ticking
Unless EPR frameworks move beyond fragmented design and compliance-driven metrics, they risk formalising the instability already embedded in the recovery chain rather than correcting it. The infrastructure gap is real, the economic misalignment is structural, and the legislative clock is running. Measurement systems that reward collection tonnage over reuse outcomes, fee structures that ignore product design, and reporting obligations that outpace supply chain data capacity will not close that gap. They will bureaucratise it.