Indian Exporters Gain Time, Not Certainty, From the US Waiver

Section 113 confines the grounds for qualification to energy. A country falls within scope on two tests, neither of which concerns tariffs, market access or bilateral balances. The first requires that it knowingly make new purchases of Russian crude or gas on or after the thirtieth day after enactment, and that it ranked among the five largest importers by volume in the 12 months before enactment. The second covers the five countries that most facilitate Russian oil sanctions evasion. India meets the volume ranking without reference to the second.

Discretion within the duty extends only to the rate. The US Trade Representative may adjust it to any level above zero and up to 100%, according to whether a country "has taken significant steps" to increase, or to decrease or cease, its purchases of Russian energy, but may not cut it to zero. The President or the Trade Representative must justify each imposition or adjustment in writing to congressional committees at least ten days in advance. Every 180 days, the Trade Representative also recalculates the five largest importers on the latest 12 months of data. Those provisions remain in force.

The waiver itself rests on Section 115, which allows the President to set aside the Act's duties after certifying to Congress that doing so serves the "national interests" of the United States. The order delegates that authority to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Treasury and the Trade Representative as appropriate, who can end the waiver as readily as it was granted. The waiver's terms do not depend on anything India does, and they do not require the US to keep it in place.

Beijing's larger share offers India no shelter. China buys about half of Russia's crude exports on the same measure, yet the law selects its targets by rank, and a five-buyer threshold reaches the second-largest buyer as surely as the first. Washington wrote its leverage over the energy purchases of third countries into statute. Changing the statute would require Congress, but restoring the duty would need only the withdrawal of the waiver.

The monitoring clause also changes which figures matter. Under the order, the Trade Representative's reports on Russian energy purchases stand between Indian exporters and a 100% duty, and those reports rest on the same crude volumes the law uses to rank its targets. India's monthly crude import figure becomes, in effect, a tariff indicator. Order books and exchange rates do not enter that calculation.

India's exposure begins with a commitment Washington says New Delhi made. The executive order that removed the additional 25% duty from 7 February 2026 states that "India has committed to stop directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil". New Delhi declined to confirm that undertaking, but the order tied India's energy policy to its trade terms months before the new law made the link statutory. India's import data show no matching change.

Those data ran the other way through the summer. Russia's share of India's crude imports was about 15% in 2022; by value, it reached 48.6% in June 2026 and an estimated 52% in July. India bought $47 billion of Russian crude in FY2025–26, and $23.61 billion in April–June 2026 alone, 55% more than a year earlier. Part of that rise came with American consent, through temporary Treasury waivers (one extended in April to run until 16 May) that allowed purchases of cargoes already at sea.

The easing since July does not amount to the cut the February order described. Sumit Ritolia of Kpler has said the moderation "is not simply a response to US tariff pressure", pointing to tighter availability and stronger competition from China. Kpler itself describes India as diversifying supply rather than abandoning Russian crude. On that reading, the decline reflects the market more than policy. That gives the US little evidence of compliance.

New Delhi's formal position has not moved either. On 17 September, before the law was signed, the Ministry of External Affairs said the bill's "potential implications for not just the bilateral relationship but also the international energy market" had "been very clearly articulated" by the Indian side. The reference to the energy market presents Russian supply as a question of price and security, which places it outside what India has offered to trade for tariff relief.

The negotiating record points the same way. On 1 October the US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, said: "I don't think there's something imminent, but we truly have identified the universe of items that are sticking points." Press reports have listed Russian oil purchases among those items. Four days later, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said the talks had reached a "plateau" beyond which "giving or taking might be very, very difficult".

The administration's reasons lie elsewhere. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the President wanted "to take the 60-day period of time" to analyse the effects, noting that conflicts were "starting to crash into each other" and naming India as a complication. On 9 October, the Treasury had issued a general licence permitting imports of Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. On Rubio's account, the review concerns economic effects and energy supply.

A Waiver Without a Date

Rubio has said the review could take up to 60 days, which would bring the next decision point to mid-December. The waiver itself has no expiry date. Until it is withdrawn, the duty remains in the order, and the Trade Representative's reports on India's Russian purchases will inform any decision to restore it. If US energy pressures ease, the reasons for keeping the waiver would weaken. Indian exporters, who have no say in the country's oil purchases, would then face a 100% duty decided by the US administration.